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1. Framework of the research 
One of the biggest conundrums in political science – more specifically in political leadership 
studies – is the theoretical and practical tension between democracy and leadership as the 
growing discourse and interest in the literature demonstrates. This conflict within democratic 
leadership cannot be understood simply as a theoretical polemic. In fact, political events draw 
attention to this tension in practice over and over again by raising and reinforcing the fear of 
leadership (“Not my President”) and even desire (“Yes we can”, “Wir schaffen das”, “Stable 
and strong leadership”) for (strong) leaders. In other words: we face here a problem, which 
goes beyond an apparent theoretical discrepancy. It defines the actual course and content of 
(democratic) leadership as well as the relationship between leaders and followers. Based on this 
consideration, the research is strongly problem-driven (Shapiro 2005). I aim to investigate and 
dissolve the theoretical and practical problem of democratic leadership by connecting theories 
of democracy and leadership. 
1.1. Research problem 
Democratic leadership is usually seen as an oxymoron or a paradox (Beerbohm 2015; Kane and 
Patapan 2012; Keohane 2010, 155–193, 2016; Ruscio 2008; Teles 2012). Seemingly the ideal 
of democracy does not tolerate the practice of leadership, since our concept of democracy is 
usually tied to the ethos of self-government, sovereignty, and equality, while (political) 
leadership often appears in our mind as a unilateral power relation, hierarchy, and manipulation. 
It’s clear: such strong leadership could only weaken democracy. 
However, the problem of democratic leadership is not new for political theory (ambiguity of 
leadership: Dahl 1961; ambivalence of executive power: Mansfield 1989), it is surrounded by 
strong suspicion and fear, so it appears rarely in the theoretical discourse (Kane and Patapan 
2012, pp. 10–30.; Ruscio 2008, p. ix). This fear can be approached from two sides. On the one 
hand, the fear of abusing power can be a satisfactory and legitimate justification for democratic 
forms of government, institutions and procedures. Hence, it seems necessary to limit leadership 
by certain principles and institutional arrangements and by maintaining a permanent 
requirement for legitimation and justification. On the other hand, it also means a serious threat, 
if practice of popular sovereignty, institutional veto players, distribution of power and checks 
and balances entirely undermine leadership and governance. In other words: it could become 
difficult or impossible for leaders to achieve the goals desired by the majority of voters. 
Therefore, democratic leadership must have a great influence and power and serve others’ will 
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at the same time. Democratic leadership is both strong and weak, since power is granted to the 
leaders  to achieve their and their followers’ goals and even limited by the constant need for 
legitimation and justification (Kane and Patapan 2012; Keohane 2010, pp. 155-93).  
So this tension can and have to be negotiated and managed by leaders, as many researchers 
claimed (Beerbohm 2015; Kane and Patapan 2012, 2014; Kane, Patapan, and ’t Hart 2009; 
Keohane 2010, pp. 155–93; 2016; Körösényi 2005; Metz 2017a; Ruscio 2008; Teles 2012, 
2015; E. T. Weber 2010; Wren 2007), but is never resolved completely and ever after. Thus, 
the question is not whether leadership is necessary for the functioning of democracy, but what 
form of leadership can be compatible with the idea of democracy. Our answer to this question 
strongly depends on what kind of democracy we want to defend and realize (Ruscio 2008, pp. 
4–6). According to the literature, the contradiction seems to be resolvable, if the concept of 
leadership and democracy is properly tailored to each other (Beerbohm 2015, p. 639; Metz 
2017). Briefly, the literature has drawn up clearly: rightly understood concepts of democracy 
and leadership are reconcilable. 
1.2. Hypothesis 
Following J. Thomas Wren’s work (2007), I assume that the concepts of democracy and 
leadership as social and historical constructs are related. Moreover, they are not just 
reconcilable, but also depend on each other. To be more provocative: there is no democracy 
without (rightly understood) leadership, and vica versa. 
Wren (2007, pp. xii; 3; 132) argues that leadership is a new mode for arranging social relations 
and determining who should belong to the few who lead the many. In this sense, we can draw 
up a parallel between democracy and leadership. “If democracy is ‘a unique system for 
organizing relations between rulers and the ruled’[Schmitter and Karl 1991, pp. 76–77], and 
leadership is ‘an influence relation among leaders and followers that facilitates the 
accomplishment of group or societal objectives’, the leadership process in a democracy might 
be viewed as simply democracy at work.” (Wren 2007, p. 2) In the concept of leadership, the 
focus shifts from the leaders to all members of the polity suggesting that this ongoing process 
is based on mutual influence. From this perspective, the tension within democratic leadership 
is seemingly fading away. Moreover, leadership as the practice of democracy gives meaning to 
democratic politics by creating its own democratic reality and fulfilling the obligations of 
legitimization and justification. In some way, this process outlines what the “good” (effective 
or/and ethical) leadership and the “right” relationship between leaders and followers should be 
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like. Thus leadership – regardless of its actual content and direction – contributes to the process 
of democratic politics. 
The conceptual and practical interdependence is strengthened by the fact that both democracy 
and leadership are essentially contested (Gallie 1955; Grint 2005a, pp. 17–19). These concepts 
are surrounded by endless debates on correct use of them, in which various definitions1 rival 
and compete with each other. Such concepts are very complex and so they can be captured in 
different ways. Their contents are open to periodical revisions, which strongly depend on the 
social and historical context. The stake of the debate is whether democratic leadership as an 
“universal idol concept”– borrowing the concept of Koselleck and his colleagues 
(“allumfassenden Idolbegriff”: Brunner, Conze, and Koselleck 1997, pp. 897–98) – embodies 
the best form of governance and political system. 
My hypothesis is based on three presuppositions. Firstly, despite the conceptual diversity, 
leadership has a stable denotation (Ciulla 2014b, pp. 12–16). So, it cannot be detached from the 
mutual influence, relationship and interactions between the leaders and the followers. Secondly, 
leadership as an action cannot be identified simply as headship, statesmanship, formal authority 
(Edinger 1975, pp. 255–56; J. W. Gardner 1990, pp. 2–3; Heifetz 1994; Kellerman 1984, pp. 
70–71; Tucker 1995, pp. 1-30.), a raw power relationship (Burns 1978, pp. 9–28), or the 
exclusive action of political elite (Blondel 2018; Zuba 2016). Finally, leadership has a 
normative connotation as well (Ciulla 2014b, 2018; Ciulla and Forsyth 2011; Kort 2008). The 
concept of leadership includes some form of effectiveness (get things done) and morality (do 
the right thing), the content and scale of which depend on followers’ voluntary action and 
consent. In this light, we can settle the role of power in the concept of leadership by drawing it 
up as a voluntary relationship (Burns 1978, p. 11; Nye 2008, pp. 27; 34) between leaders and 
followers. 
  
                                                          
1 The countless interpretations of leadership and democracy are good examples for this conceptual uncertainty. While Joseph 
C. Rost (1991) reviewed 221 different definitions from 587 works published between 1900-1990, Jean-Paul Gagnon and his 
colleagues (2014; see also Collier and Levitsky 1997) collected 507 different forms of democracies. 
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2. Methodological framework 
The aim of the research is to understand democratic leadership both on the theoretical and the 
practical level. I am looking for answers to two connected questions: How can the problem of 
democratic leadership be solved at the theoretical level? How does it dissolve in practice? In 
order to answer these questions simultaneously, the research requires an approach that is able 
to handle the conceptual diversity of democratic leadership and to examine the problem of 
democratic leadership at both levels. For this reason, I create and apply two constructivist 
perspectives. Gail Fairhurst and David Grant2 (2010, pp. 177–78) distinguish between the (1) 
construction of social reality, which emphasizes the cognitive products of social interactions; 
and the (2) social construction of reality, which focuses on these interactions themselves. I 
clarify my initial questions and the steps of the research building on these perspectives. 
The (1) construction of social reality foregrounds citizen’s perceptions and sense-making, and 
more precisely: the meaning of leadership (Grint 2014, pp. 242). To specify my first question 
in this light: In what kind of theoretical constructs could we think about democratic leadership? 
To provide adequate answers to this question, I will reveal the implicit leadership theories of a 
moral, a material and a political concept of democracy, namely: the theory of the deliberative-
participatory, the aggregative-pluralist and the leader democracy (Pakulski and Körösényi 
2012). Wren (2007, 4) borrowed the method of implicit leadership theories from the field of 
social psychology (Fairhurst and Grant 2010, 178; Fischbein and Lord 2004) and adapted it to 
the context of historical and theoretical analysis. The implicit theories are “filters” through 
which followers perceive and interpret others’ actions. These determine the criteria based on 
which an actor can be called as a leader, or an action can be considered as leadership. In the 
case of the mentioned conceptions of democracy, implicit leadership theories function as lens, 
which define how “good” leadership and “right” relationship between leaders and followers 
should be seen. 
Following Wren’s work, I applied a specific protocol of analysis to isolate and identify key 
premises and assumptions on the theories of democracy and democratic leadership in order to 
make analytical sense of the countless sources upon which this research is built. The benefit of 
this analytical template (Table 1) lies in revealing the not explicitly addressed elements of 
democratic leadership, and clarifying the differences between the theories. 
                                                          
2 Fairhurst and Grant (2010) borrowed the distinction from Bennett Pearce (1995). 
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Table 1: Template of analysis 
Constructs of democracy 
Input side of democratic politics catalyst of the political process (political participation), citizens’ 
political competences and the nature of preferences 
Process of democratic politics direction and content of the process 
Output side of democratic politics result of the political process, role of election and vote 
Constructs of democratic leadership 
“Good” leadership challenges (goals), and political knowledge 
“Right” relationship between 
leaders and followers 
power relationship, direction of interactions, and the role of leaders and 
followers 
In this frame, I firstly reveal the core premises and assumptions of democratic theories focusing 
on the process, as well as on the input and output side of democratic politics. It is particularly 
important to see how these theories describe the role of political participation, the citizens and 
their preferences, as well as the direction, content and outcome of the political process. Hereby 
these theoretical frameworks determine the context in which we can think about democratic 
leadership. Secondly, I reconstruct and rethink the meaning of democratic leadership within 
these frames. On the one hand, I focus on „good” leadership by considering how they define 
leadership challenges and the political knowledge required to meet these challenges. On the 
other hand, I look at more closely how they organize the right relationship between leaders and 
followers by settling power relations, interactions and the leadership roles. By this method, I 
draw up three particular types of democratic leadership, and analyze how they contribute to the 
specific visions of democratic politics. After all, these types establish a typology for democratic 
leadership. 
Concerning the (2) social construction of reality, the researches focus on investigating the 
interactions that create political reality. Leadership here is not a “product of thought” or a 
theoretical construct, but a collective action that shapes the understanding of politics. Thus, the 
subject of studies is the “leadership of meaning” (Grint 2014, p. 242). In this sense, I ask here 
how democratic leadership is created in practice, or from another perspective: how leaders 
create their own democratic reality. In the empirical phase of the research, I focus on leaders’ 
rhetorical and performative action.  
Based on Keith Grint’s works (2001, 2005b), I draw up this collective meaning-making process 
along five analytical dimensions: building identity, defining situation, creating vision, setting 
up tactics and mobilizing followers (Table 2). Structuring cases along with these five aspects 
contributes to the whole research in three ways. Firstly, it links the leaders’ rhetoric (wordcraft) 
and actual performances (stagecraft) (Uhr 2014), which together provide the leadership 
practices. Secondly, the analysis involves both leaders and followers by taking account of 
9 
 
mobilization. Thus, we can construct a comprehensive picture about leadership without missing 
the elements of the concept’s denotation. This means that construct of leadership created by 
leaders cannot be accepted based on its nominal value since it is evaluated by followers. In this 
sense, the differences between leaders’ words and deeds are relevant only insofar as they are 
articulated in the relation to followers. Putting it simply, the question here is whether followers 
consider leaders authentic in the light of leadership created by leaders. Thirdly, by structuring 
leaders’ stories in a transparent way it becomes possible to highlight the elements of leadership 
types and to position leaders in the typology and comparing them. Moreover, along with the 
analytical dimensions, the abstract elements of leadership types and latent features of the cases 
can be identified. 
Table 2: Dimensions of empirical analysis and their relations to the elements of theoretical leadership 
constructs 
 Good leadership Right relationship 
1. Identity 
(Who are we?) 
- Role of followers: 
What role do followers have in the 
leadership process? 
2. Situation 
(Where are we?) 
Challenges: 
What challenges must leadership 
face? 
- 
3. Vision 
(What do we want to achieve?) 
Challenges: 
What goals are set by leadership? 
- 
4. Tactics 
(How do we want to achieve it?) 
Political knowledge: 
What political knowledge do 
leaders need to choose the right 
means to achieve their goals? 
Direction of interactions: 
How can the interactions between 
leaders and followers be drawn up? 
Power relationship: 
How can the power relationship 
between leaders and followers be 
interpreted? 
Role of leaders and followers: 
What role do leaders and followers 
play in the leadership process? 
5. Mobilization 
(Why do we want to achieve it?) 
Feedback: 
evaluation of leadership by followers 
During the identity building, leaders do not just create their „imaginary” community (Grint 
2001, p. 6), but also determine what role followers could get in that relationship. By defining 
the situation, the leaders describe what challenge they must face, while they set goals and 
concretize the direction of action in their vision. Tactics are adapted to optimize the exploitation 
of resources to reach these goals. Leaders aim to determine the outcomes of collective actions. 
In this process, leaders must demonstrate the appropriate political knowledge in their choice of 
means, decision making and politics. Tactics minimize the gap between leaders and followers 
by synchronizing their will and action. In this sense, it becomes crucial for leaders to arrange 
their relationship with their followers regarding power relationship, direction of interactions 
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and leadership roles. Mobilization of followers is based on evaluating and accepting leaders’ 
performance. On one side, leaders make attempt to influence their followers by persuasive 
communication, but on the other, followers judge their leaders by expressing and changing their 
preferences. 
In the empirical analysis, I examine two problematic leadership situations: Angela Merkel’s 
and Viktor Orbán’s leadership during the migration crisis in 2015-16, and Theresa May’s and 
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership between the Brexit referendum that took place on 23 June 2016 
and the general election held on 8 June 2017. I will compare and place them into the typology 
of democratic leadership, which as a heuristic device enables us to understand these situations 
more deeply. 
Case selection is based on two circumstances. On the one hand, the above-mentioned leaders 
they are placed in the middle of events, which some analysts and commentators interpreted as 
challenges to democracy while others described those as a fulfillment of democracy. Generally, 
this kind of uncertainty highlights and contrasts the problem of democratic leadership, which 
can be easily concealed by the routine course of political action. On the other hand, these leaders 
provide significantly different picture about democratic leadership, which makes it easier to 
place them closer to one type of leadership or another. 
In the case studies, I analyze both leaders’ rhetoric and actions, focusing on their speeches, 
interviews and press conferences, political decisions and their politics’ effects on followers. 
Therefore, I chose three different methods – qualitative content analysis, historical narrative 
analysis, analysis of opinion polls and elections – that contribute differently to the exploration 
of leadership (Table 3). 
Table 3: Focal points of empirical analysis 
 Content 
analysis 
Historical 
analysis 
Analysis of opinion 
polls and elections 
Identity X - - 
Situation X - - 
Vision X - - 
Tactics X X - 
Mobilization X X X 
The purpose of empirical analysis is not to provide a quantifiable result, or a proof for 
theoretical leadership constructs, but to demonstrate the relevance and analytical utility of the 
typology and to restructure and understand more deeply these problematic leadership situations. 
This work intends to join the agenda of the critical leadership studies (Collinson 2014; 
Collinson and Grint 2005), which aims to highlight and understand the changing nature of 
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leadership by recalling and rethinking its fundamental dilemmas and contradictions. In my 
hypothesis I stated that the concepts of democracy and leadership do not contradict each other 
but depend on each other. Moreover, if we look at the practice, political leadership contributes 
formatively and constitutively to the process and idea of democracy. Based on this, I wish to 
resolve the tension within democratic leadership both at the theoretical and the practical level. 
The stake of this venture lies at the heart of that experience demonstrating that this problem has 
not just theoretical, but practical relevance as well. 
The aim of the research is to form a typology focusing on democratic leadership and to apply it 
in the two perspectives of constructivism. At the theoretical level, the typology includes three 
different perspectives which frame the possible interpretations of democratic leadership. At the 
empirical level, the typology provides a “plural” reading and understanding of actual leadership 
situations. In this plural reading we cannot just avoid discrediting and delegitimizing any 
relevant forms of leadership, but we can also manage our own theoretical assumptions, their 
impacts on the knowledge of leadership and interpretation of leaders’ rhetoric and performance 
in a transparent manner. Overall, the innovation and complementary knowledge provided by 
the research relies on its direction and mode to resolve the tension within democratic leadership. 
More specifically, (1) my thesis goes beyond the conceptual strategies applied in literature; (2) 
my analytical approach based on the two viewpoints of constructivism connects the theoretical 
and practical levels of research problem; (3) my typology allows plural reading of leadership 
situations without discrediting and delegitimizing any relevant elements. 
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3. Main findings 
3.1. Democratic leadership in theory: the typology of democratic leadership 
In drawing up the relation between democracy and leadership, the first step is to reveal the key 
premises of democratic theories. I focus on three different concepts of democracy: the moral 
concept of deliberative-participatory democracy, the material concept of aggregative-pluralist 
democracy, and the political concept of leader democracy. As a moral theory, deliberative-
participatory democracy articulates the normative goal that citizen’s control and autonomy 
should be strengthened in politics. Lowering expectations, aggregative-pluralist democracy 
focuses on how citizen’s preferences could be aggregated to a specific governmental program 
or public politics and on how various groups’ interests could transform into political power 
without damaging democratic frames. However, for the theory of leader democracy, democratic 
politics is just a method or a mean for selecting leaders to rule and govern. Looking through the 
basic assumptions and premises of the theories (Table 4), I point out how they construct and 
justify their picture of democracy. 
Table 4: Three concepts of democracy 
 Deliberative-participatory 
democracy 
as a moral concept of 
democracy 
Aggregative-pluralist 
democracy 
as a material concept of 
democracy 
Leader democracy 
as a political concept of 
democracy 
Input side 
Catalyst direct and non-conventional 
participation 
indirect and conventional 
participation 
leaders’ action as a distinct 
form of participation 
Citizens public-minded, rational, 
competent and well-informed 
self-oriented, rational, 
competent, but ill-informed 
self-oriented, irrational, 
incompetent, but uninformed 
Preferences ex-post ex-ante ex-post 
Political process 
Direction* bottom-up bottom-up top-down 
Content multilateral forming of 
preferences by deliberation 
mechanical aggregation of 
preferences (responsive 
politics) 
unilateral forming of 
preferences by manipulation 
Output side 
Role of election 
and vote* 
secondary, but unavoidable: 
temporary closure of 
deliberation 
primary: formal aggregation 
of preferences 
primary: selecting, replacing 
and authorizing leaders 
Result fair decision acceptable for all 
(through a constant building of 
consensus 
compromise based on an 
aggregate decision (majority 
rule) 
solving collective problems 
(otherwise the leader will be 
replaced) 
*based on Pakulski and Körösényi 2012, 100 
On the input side of democratic politics, I inquire who are the main actors of politics and what 
triggers the political process. Political participation is always the catalyst for political process. 
But in the theory of deliberative-participatory it is non-conventional and direct, and ought to be 
widened, while in aggregative-pluralist democracy citizens initiate political process indirectly 
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through politicians via formal and conventional action. By contrast, in leader democracy, the 
political process is started by leaders’ decisions and actions as a distinct form of participation. 
However, while leaders’ privilege is to participate with real political effect, it seems necessary 
that citizens passively and sometimes actively contribute to the political process by authorizing 
and replacing leaders. Accordingly, we can also draw different pictures from citizens. In the 
deliberative-participatory democracy public-minded, rational, competent and well-informed 
citizens are needed, while the aggregative-pluralist democracy is more pessimistic about how 
informed citizens are and emphasizes selfish and egoist motivations. Leader democracy offers 
the most pessimistic picture on citizens, when it distinguishes citizens from professional 
politicians by describing their political competences and consciousness. Although politics is 
organized around citizen’s preferences in all three theories, the assumed nature of those 
preferences differs significantly. In deliberative-participatory – and leader democracy they are 
being changed through the political process (ex-post), but they are given for aggregative-
pluralist democracy (ex-ante). 
During the examination of the process of democratic politics, I focus on how theories place 
actors into the political process. The first two theoretical frameworks describe a bottom-up 
process that form preferences to public interest by multilateral deliberation or mechanical 
aggregation. By contrast, leader democracy describes a top-down process, which is determined 
by monopolistic competition of leaders and unilateral formation and manipulation of 
preferences. 
Regarding the output side of the politics, I point to the goals of the process, or more precisely 
what politics is going for. In deliberative-participatory democracy the institution of voting is 
secondary, but it is inevitable when the deliberation has to be temporarily closed. The politics 
here results in a fair decision which is acceptable for all, but it remains questionable later on. 
This means that consensus for the theory will be a constant but unreachable goal. However, 
election and vote as preference aggregation mechanisms are primary for aggregative-pluralist 
theory since it establishes a stable base for compromise. From different reasons this institution 
is important for leader democracy as well, because leaders could be selected, authorized and 
replaced only by elections. However, the aim of politics is here not this, but a “good” 
governance that tackles and solves collective problems of the political community. 
The concepts of democracy require different types of leadership and prescribe different 
relationship between leaders and followers. I created three possible interpretations (implicit 
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theories) of leadership (Table 5). All of them show “strong” leadership, which do not endanger, 
but rather strengthen and promote democracy. So they contribute to democracy in different 
ways. Or in other words: they describe different practices of democracy. 
Table 5: Typology of democratic leadership 
 Deliberative-participatory 
democracy 
Aggregative-pluralist 
democracy 
Leader democracy 
Good leadership 
 transforming leadership 
(moral concept of democratic 
leadership) 
transactional leadership  
(material concept of democratic 
leadership) 
charismatic leadership 
(political concept of 
democratic leadership) 
Challenges “moral founding” 
 
• moral guidance; 
• constructive and adaptive 
problem solving through 
deliberation; 
• empowering followers to 
participate in deliberation and 
become leaders 
"making politics” 
 
• ensuring political 
participation to express 
preferences; 
• producing political program 
based on public interest from 
pre-existing preferences 
"overcoming uncertainty” 
 
• proving competences and 
virtues; 
• building new political 
orders (leadership as 
monopoly) or regimes and 
destroying old ones 
Political 
knowledge** 
episteme  
(theoretical knowledge) 
techne  
(productive, technical 
knowledge) 
praxis 
(practical knowledge, ability 
to act) 
Right relationship 
Power relation exercising power with others 
(empowerment) 
exercising power over others 
(domination) 
exercising power to do 
something for others 
(authorization) 
Direction of 
interaction* 
horizontal 
(value-based) 
vertical 
(interest-based) 
vertical 
(emotional) 
Role of leaders 
and 
coactive reactive proactive 
followers coactive proactive reactive 
*based on Pakulski and Körösényi 2012, 100 
**based on Körösényi 2005, 239 
Deliberative-participatory democracy favors primarily the Burnsian transforming, moral 
leadership (see Barber 1989, pp. 237–42, 2004; Burns 1978, 2003; Ruscio 2008), which has to 
cope with the challenge of “moral founding” of a more democratic political system and process. 
However, this challenge becomes permanent because of the unattainable nature of ideal 
democracy. It consists of three crucial aims. Firstly, leaders have to provide a moral 
(ideological) guidance based on the their universal theoretical knowledge (episteme: Körösényi 
2005, p. 233) and moral character. They have to ask the right questions (truth-seeking) and 
determine and facilitate the right way of democratic public reason (truth-giving) as well. Thus, 
leadership is value-rational (M. Weber 1978, pp. 24–25), and could only be judged from the 
viewpoint of the Weberian ethics of conviction (M. Weber 1946, pp. 120–27). Secondly, leaders 
have to handle problems and conflicts in a constructive and adaptive way through the process 
of deliberation (Barber 1989, 2004, pp. 237–42; Gastil 1994, pp. 960–62), in which they have 
to facilitate and promote coercion-free communication based on mutual respect, recognition 
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and reciprocity. The third task is to empower and enable followers to participate in politics and 
to become leaders (empowerment: Barber 1989, p. 121; Burns 2003, pp. 25–26; 182–85; Ciulla 
2014; Gastil 1994, pp. 959–60; Perkins 2010). In short: transforming leadership allows political 
participation and deliberation by educating and transforming followers, by supporting the 
rationalization and convergence of preferences and by facilitating consensual and fair decisions. 
As a result, the roles of leaders and followers can be often inverted (law of the situation: Follett 
1942b) and they exercise the social and political power collectively (power with: Follett 1930, 
pp. 179–94, 1942). The interactions between leaders and followers becomes horizontal, in 
which they must be coactive actors (Barber 1989, pp. 121–25, 2004, pp. 239–40; Gastil 1994, 
pp. 958–63; Kuyper 2012; Raelin 2012). This relationship relies on certain end-values (e.g. 
liberty, justice and equality: Burns 1978, p. 426) and political participation. On this basis, it can 
be stated that real political participation of citizens and bottom-up political process presuppose 
transforming leadership. 
In the aggregative-pluralist theoretical framework, Burns’ transactional leadership (Burns 
1978; Downton 1973) can prevail to deal with the challenge of “making politics”, which implies 
aggregating preferences and forming compromise. Transactional leadership has to connect 
individual preferences and public interest to democratic governance within market-like 
exchanges and bargain. Firstly, leadership needs to maintain collective action of citizens to 
create public goods and express preferences (Olson 1971, pp. 174–78). Secondly, leadership 
has to produce politics and policies that embody the public interest (Downs 1957, p. 87, 1962; 
McFarland 1969). Leaders can only fine-tune politics by selective incentives (Olson 1971, pp. 
174–78), “hard power” (Downton 1973; Nye 2008, pp. 77–84), and heresthetics (Riker 1986; 
see: Körösényi 2009a, 2009b; McLean 2002). Choosing and applying the right means requires 
a productive technical knowledge (techne: Körösényi 2005, pp. 232–33), which helps leaders 
to produce policies from given preferences and to operate the machinery of politics. Their action 
is instrumentally rational (M. Weber 1978, pp. 24–25), and can be judged based on the ethic of 
responsibility (M. Weber 1946, pp. 120–27). This means that leaders cannot neglect and 
disregard the rules of democratic game and have to respect the institutional and procedural 
modal values (e.g. honesty, responsibility, fairness, the honoring of commitments: surrounding 
the institutions Burns 1978, p. 426), while they are enforcing public interest. This knowledge 
can be mastered by anyone who accepts these rules of democratic politics. Although leaders 
have the greatest influence in politics and exercise power over their followers (Dahl 1957, pp. 
202–3); they are also controlled by institutions, procedures, citizens’ preferences and will (Dahl 
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1961, p. 258; see: Keohane 2015). Since followers do not lose their ability to initiate proactively 
political action, leaders are forced into a reactive position (cf. eventful man: Hook 1955). 
Overall, the relationship between leaders and followers is hierarchical and vertical, but the two 
sides are mutually dependent on each other. Thus, the bottom-up nature of the political process 
and the dominant role of the leader (power relations, vertical interactions) can be maintained. 
Leader democracy is built explicitly on the need of highly effective charismatic (Tucker 1968, 
1995; M. Weber 1987, pp 248–60; 271–75, 1989, 2009, pp. 340–417) and innovative 
(Schumpeter 2006; Brooker 2010) leadership, which could handle the alleged and real 
collective problems by overcoming the uncertainty and contingency of politics (Körösényi, 
Illés, and Metz 2016). In this sense, the purpose of democratic politics and leadership is the 
same. Democratic politics as leadership (Tucker 1995) faces two tasks. Firstly, leaders must 
prove and demonstrate their capability to govern. To do so, they need to have highly context-
dependent virtues (“sense of proportion”, “virtú”) and practical political knowledge (praxis: 
Körösényi 2005, pp. 232–33), which enable them to act and make decisions responsibly. 
However, leaders’ abilities and competences (charisma) must be recognized and acknowledged 
by their followers (M. Weber 1946, pp. 1111–15, 1978, pp 241–45; 267–69). Secondly, leaders  
must create a new political order or regime (Illés, Körösényi, and Metz 2018) based on their 
charismatic revelation, vision or innovation, which entails the destruction of the old order 
(creative destruction: Schumpeter 2006, p. 83; M. Weber 1946, pp. 1115–17). Consequently, 
the leaders, who do not tolerate any rivalries, create a monopoly for leadership (M. Weber 1946, 
pp. 1111–15, 1978, pp. 267–69). Based on these, leaders’ devotion (passion) and vision (sense 
of responsibility) need both instrumental and value rationality as the internal logic of their 
action, while their external evaluation is provided by both the ethic of ultimate ends and that of 
responsibility. 
However, citizen’s political role and participation are secondary for the theory of leader 
democracy; followership becomes a crucial moment (M. Weber 1978, pp. 267–69). The 
community of followers connects to leaders emotionally (M. Weber 1946, pp. 103–4), to whom 
they subordinate themselves and whom they authorize to act (power to). Therefore, this 
relationship is unavoidably vertical, in which the leader's role is proactive, while the followers 
become reactive. Charismatic leadership is controlled and limited only by the fact that followers 
cannot be forced by discipline (violence) (M. Weber 1946, pp. 1148–56) to recognize and 
acknowledge leaders’ charisma. 
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By revealing the implicit theories of democratic leadership, I develop a typology. Looking more 
closely at the different views of democracy, it becomes apparent that leadership can play a 
crucial role by contributing to democratic politics in some way. In their theoretical context, they 
present sterile but coherent images in which the expectations set for democratic leadership are 
easier to recognize. According to this, we can also talk about a moral, a material and a political 
concept of democratic leadership. This comprehensive typology allows plural readings and 
interpretations of concrete leadership practices in democracies, and so it seems appropriate to 
assist at an empirical analysis as a heuristic tool. 
3.2. Democratic leadership in practice 
Concerning the practical problem of democratic leadership, I asked the question: how is 
democratic leadership being constructed in practice? Or, more precisely: how can the leaders 
create their own democratic realities and practices, how do they justify their leadership for their 
followers? During the analysis of the four leaders (Angela Merkel, Viktor Orbán, Theresa May 
and Jeremy Corbyn), leadership types served as reference points or heuristic devices to 
understand their practices of democracy. The leaders’ constructs of democratic leadership can 
be placed closer to one or the other theoretical position. 
3.2.1. Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’ leadership during the refugee/migration 
crisis 
The refugee or migration crisis has clearly highlighted the need and necessity of good 
democratic leadership. Angela Merkel and Viktor Orbán defined the crisis situation and their 
leadership differently, so they are judged from different grounds as well. I outlined their 
leadership stories in a way that makes the different types of democratic leadership recognizable, 
thereby highlighting the differences between the two leaders (Table 6). It is important to 
underline that research here does not want to say that one of them has been “better” based on 
moral or efficiency considerations, but to point out that they have shown completely different 
types of democratic leadership.  
What challenges have leaders faced? What goals have been set by leaders? 
During the crisis, the two leaders faced different challenges. Orbán’s interpretation of the crisis 
followed the narrative of securitization (see also Szalai and Gőbl 2016), which prescribed to 
overcome uncertainty by the protection of the public security, the living standards, the Christian 
and national culture. As a consequence of crisis dramatization, the situation escalated and 
spilled over into the crisis of European identity, elite and democracy. By contrast, Merkel 
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described the situation as a humanitarian crisis (see also Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2018; 
Mushaben 2017b, 2017a), in which the moral hazards of terrorism, extreme right-wing 
mobilization and lack of European solidarity could rise. This led directly to the idea and the 
challenge of "moral founding", which could be grasped in the aim of shaping German and 
European community into societies of “Willkommenskultur”. 
Leaders drew different goals to cope with their differently construed crises. To overcome 
uncertainty, Orbán made a great effort to create an old-new order (Orbán’s regime in Hungary, 
new migration policy in Europe) and to question the European Union’s normative power based 
on liberal values (see also Illés, Körösényi, and Metz 2018; Metz 2017b). In this frame, Orbán’s 
populism demonstrated his honesty, authenticity and sense of reality, which enabled him to 
lead. By contrast, Merkel formulated the challenge of moral leadership in her transformational 
leadership. This was supported by her moral guidance on “rightly” understood crisis based on 
defending certain end-values (tolerance, justice, freedom, openness and solidarity). This 
involved the need and requirement of empowering followers (citizens and refugees) to actively 
contribute to crisis management. Nevertheless, the transformation of followers (open society, 
integration of refugees) was subordinated to a constructive problem-solving, which was 
articulated as a task of transactional leadership (forming governmental program based on public 
interest) emphasizing the economic and demographic opportunities of refugees’ integration. 
What political knowledge did leaders need to choose the right means to achieve their goals? 
By setting up tactics, leaders demonstrated the political knowledge required for overcoming 
challenges and achieving goals. Merkel's tactics was characterized by a duality: she had to 
demonstrate a strong moral commitment and responsibility as well as a pragmatic and task-
oriented problem solving at the same time. Accordingly, Merkel's politics required both 
ideological and philosophical (episteme) and technical (productive) knowledge (techne). This 
meant that the German Chancellor wished to achieve her moral goals with hard power (with 
selective incentives and legal sanctions) and with her sense of compromise. In contrast to 
providing vision, Merkel’s tactics indicated transactional leadership. For Orbán, the challenge 
of overcoming uncertainties (creating new order, proving competences and abilities) demanded 
strong and vigorous political responses and actions that reflect his political virtues and practical 
knowledge (praxis). Therefore, Orbán’s tactics focused on effective management of illegal 
migration, and neutralization of European liberal refugee policies. 
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How can the power relationship between leaders and followers be interpreted? 
The relationship between leaders and followers was coordinated by both leaders. One of the 
most critical elements was to determine the power relations. The empowerment projected by 
Merkel’s rhetoric assumed a form of power exercised collectively with followers. However, 
this offer remained symbolic, since she tried to achieve her goals (e.g. integration and 
registration) by selective incentives and legal sanctions that demonstrated her power over 
others. In contrast, Orbán explicitly asked his followers for more power to accomplish what the 
citizens were not able to do (authorization). 
How can the interactions between leaders and followers be drawn up? 
Power relations determined the direction of interactions between leaders and followers. Both 
leaders drew a vertical relationship. However, for Merkel it was based on her positional 
interpretation of leadership and interest-based interactions, while for Orbán it means followers’ 
emotional devotion. 
What role do leaders and followers play in the leadership process? 
During building collective identity and creating effective tactics, the leadership roles became 
clear. In addition to placing the national community on a moral ground, the refugees and the 
member states of the EU were also required to be followers of Merkel leadership. All of them 
had to participate coactively in managing crisis: citizens must help the integration process, 
refugees should accept the moral ground of German society and integrate themselves into it, 
and member countries must take part in the common European solution. Meanwhile, Merkel 
followed the events in a reactive way, which is more familiar in the transactional form of 
leadership. By contrast, Orbán restricted the community of followers to Christian Hungary, 
Central Europe and Europe. He sharply separated immigrants and political actors (left-wing 
political elite, Brussels’ Bureaucrats, civil activists and George Soros) considered responsible 
for the crisis from his community. Interestingly, outsiders to the group were proactive by 
creating crisis situations, while Orbán’s followers became reactive and passive, who need to be 
defended by his proactive leadership. 
Overall, Merkel hardly became completely a transforming leader during the crisis since her 
pragmatic task- and compromise-oriented transactional leadership dominated her tactics (cf. 
Helms 2012, pp. 119-123.; Helms and Van Esch 2017; Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2018; 
Middelhoff, Schijvenaars, and De Landtsheer 2016). Although such moral commitments were 
not typical for Merkel’s leadership, but so did she approach the idea of transforming leadership 
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(cf. Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2018; Mushaben 2017a; Stefani 2017). This moral 
commitment went beyond the modal values associated with transactional leadership, although 
it is important to underline that Merkel identified the German constitution as the source of these 
values. It is noteworthy that Merkel took political risks and made a stand for these values. Thus, 
although her political position has become uncertain as a result of the change of citizens’ 
preferences, she successfully created dual (value- and interest-based) attachment for her 
followers by providing compromise with tightening her refugee policy, and by not giving up 
the symbolic moral commitment. As a result, Merkel's democratic leadership has found its 
audience and managed to defend its main policy direction during the first years of crisis. 
Table 6: Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’s leadership 
 Angela Merkel Viktor Orbán 
Good leadership 
Challenges moral founding (German and European 
society as „Willkommenskultur”) 
 
 
- moral guidance (situation as humanitarian 
crisis) 
- empowering followers (mobilizing civil 
society and integrating refugees) 
- constructive problem solving (facilitating 
the transformation of followers) 
subordinated to form governmental program 
based on public interest (integration as 
economic and demographic opportunity) 
(transactional leadership < transforming 
leadership) 
overcoming uncertainties (defending the county and 
Europe from the migration crisis and the crisis of 
European identity, elite and democracy) 
 
- proving competences and abilities (populism as 
honesty, authenticity, and sense of reality) 
- creating new order (a new migration policy based 
on national and Christian values, the protection of 
Orbán’s regime) 
(charismatic leadership) 
Political 
knowledge 
techne (setting up effective tactics: „Wir 
schaffen das”) 
episteme (value-based identity, situation 
definition and vision) 
(transactional leadership > transforming 
leadership) 
praxis (strong and vigorous political responses and 
actions) 
(charismatic leadership) 
Right relationship 
Power relation exercising power with others (followers 
active, but symbolic participation in crisis 
management) 
exercising power over others („als 
Bundeskanzlerin”; „meine Aufgabe”; selective 
incentives and legal sanctions) 
(transactional leadership > transforming 
leadership) 
exercising power to do something for others 
(populist and illiberal democratic authorization) 
(charismatic leadership) 
Direction of 
interactions 
vertical (positional approach to leadership, 
interest-based relationship) 
(transactional leadership) 
vertical (necessity of leader, emotional attachment) 
(charismatic leadership) 
Role of leaders reactive (following events) proactive (initiating action) 
and followers coactive (citizens, refugees and EU member 
states’ active participation in crisis 
management) 
(transactional leadership > transforming 
leadership) 
reactive (defending national community and 
Christian culture) 
(charismatic leadership) 
21 
 
The crisis provided an opportunity for Orbán to strengthen and preserve followers’ emotional 
engagement to his charisma. He constantly dramatized the crisis to create the need for his 
leadership to overcome the uncertainties. He proved his abilities and efforts to protect his "old-
new" political order and regime. Particularly worthy of consideration are Orbán's thoughts on 
leadership and democracy, which pointed out that he seeks and asks his followers for power to 
defend the community. This call was addressed only to his audience excluding those who could 
not been expected to follow his lead. However, it is also important to see that certain elements 
(the picture of the EU and immigrants, the definition and management of the crisis) of his 
leadership were widely supported by citizens. This may indicate that the Hungarian political 
context favors the charismatic leadership, which Orbán also recognized. 
3.2.1. Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership between the Brexit referendum 
and the general election 
The period between the Brexit referendum and the general election was determined by the 
question of who could provide an “adequate” leadership in this uncertain and contingent 
situation. Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leaderships (Table 7) were interesting in many 
ways. On the one hand, their stories were similar in many respects (e.g. creating the group of 
followers), but they have drawn different conclusions. On the other hand, the consequences of 
contradictions in May's leadership became tangible in the development of voter preferences. 
What challenges did leaders face? What goals were set by leaders? 
May and Corbyn both saw the uncertainty and opportunities in the Brexit decision. This 
uncertainty did not arise from external factors, but from ineffective (e.g. Corbyn) or morally 
hazardous politics (e.g. May). However, this did not call for charismatic leadership. May 
described the situation as the challenge of “making politics” (transactional leadership), in which 
she tried to connect preferences and public will expressed in the referendum to governance. By 
contrast, interpreting Brexit was particularly difficult for Corbyn because of its negative moral 
connotations and his reluctant Remain campaign. To bridge this gap, he provided a strong moral 
stance and foundation (transforming leadership) along left-wing and liberal values. 
Corbyn's moral founding meant creating a “kinder” (more democratic) politics. In his 
interpretation, the referendum wasn’t a manifestation of democracy, but a cry for a more 
democratic and fair politics and society. Brexit provided a perfect opportunity to extend his 
vision on “new” democratic politics announced earlier. For this reason, it was essential that his 
moral guidance mediates and embodies certain end-values (e.g. social justice, solidarity, 
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equality and internationalism). In addition, Corbyn emphasized the empowerment of followers 
as well, which was manifested in his tactics of permanent mobilization and movement politics. 
Constructive problem solving was also a crucial elements of Corbyn’s politics. He was not just 
(symbolically) open to debate freely the social and political issues led to Brexit in „human 
rights language”, but he aimed at expanding discourse and eliminating disturbing factors like 
racism and xenophobia. 
In contrast, May's vision was limited to pragmatic politics based on the interest of “ordinary 
working people”, whom British politics just left behind. May’s leadership focused on forming 
a clear policy from Brexit decision; therefore she needed to call her followers once again to 
express their preferences in order to create a more stable and stronger mandate for her 
leadership. From her perspective, the referendum was a clear manifestation of democracy that 
restored British parliamentary democracy and national self-determination. In this sense, one of 
her main goals was to maintain and initiate collective action for the re-affirmation of public 
will. May made a great effort to define the public interest expressed at the referendum. 
However, she ruled out any compromise by recognizing only one reading of Brexit (“Brexit 
means Brexit”), which she had to enforce as the public interest demanded. As regards the 
content of public interest, May has also set a goal in foreign policy (“Global Britain”) and in 
domestic policy (“Great Meritocracy”). Her politics had approached the idea of charismatic 
leadership (the need to create a new order), but she didn’t create an emotional (charismatic) 
relationship with her followers, and didn’t proved the required political virtues, but attempted 
to strengthen an interest-based relationship and to manage Brexit as a technical problem. 
What political knowledge did leaders need to choose the right means to achieve their goals? 
Leaders’ vision and tactics highlighted the political knowledge they wished to demonstrate. 
Theresa May appeared as an “expert” and a “professional” manager, whose task is technical by 
its nature. Thus she could just produce and “deliver” the “best deal” during exit negotiations to 
satisfy the public will. In this sense, strong and stable leadership meant fulfillment of a specific 
mandate and pledge by using hard power and selective incentives. This required a technical and 
productive knowledge (techne). By contrast, Jeremy Corby's leadership and authenticity were 
based on his moral character and ideological knowledge (episteme). Challenge of moral 
founding presupposed an ideological (value-driven) thinking (ethic of ultimate ends: Shaw 
2017), which Corbyn has derived from the values, moral commitment and conviction of his 
party and movement. In the end, he became a moral leader who was surrounded by a cult of 
personality among his followers and supporters. 
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How can the power relationship between leaders and followers be interpreted? 
Arranging the relationship between leaders and followers was a serious problem due to the 
nature of Brexit that increased the distance between them. To fill this gap, leaders aimed to 
settle power relations. May described a position- and self-centered leadership and relied on the 
hard power and selective incentives of her office. This meant that May exercised her power 
over others to dominate political processes and so achieve the collective goals. By contrast, 
Corbyn's movement grassroots activity demonstrated his vision of democratic politics, in which 
the idea of exercising collectively power with others could be realized. 
How can the interactions between leaders and followers be drawn up? 
The power relation determined the interactions between leaders and followers as well. While 
May has outlined an interest-based vertical relationship, Corbyn has created a horizontal one 
with their followers along certain values and participation. 
What role do leaders and followers play in the leadership process? 
Both leaders aimed to address ordinary working people, who chose to leave the EU. They 
became a base of imaginary community of followers. However, May described her followers 
as an interest-based community which proactively declared their preferences in the referendum. 
By contrast, Corbyn saw them as a moral community, which should coactively participate in 
overcoming the challenge of Brexit. At the same time, Corbyn has also showed himself in a 
coactive role during the permanent mobilization and movement politics. May’s transactional 
leadership projected a reactive role by subordinating herself to the public will. This was 
reflected in changing her position on Brexit and forming her cabinet including both sides of 
“leavers” and “remainers”, but her hard interpretation of Brexit could not provide room for 
wider social compromise. Moreover she has begun to play a proactive role, which gave rise to 
contradictions in her leadership, questioning her authenticity  
Overall, it is not no exaggeration to say that the general election measured the leaders’ 
authenticity. While Corbyn was able to embody transforming leadership credibly (cf. Bennister, 
Worthy, and Keith 2017; Crines 2017) by defining Brexit as a moral challenge and applying 
movement politics, May’s transactional leadership has lost its authenticity (cf. Worthy and 
Bennister 2017) due to contradictions that appeared in her tactics ,and insufficient performance 
in overcoming the challenge of making politics (ensuring political participation to express 
preferences, producing political program based on public interest from pre-existing 
preferences). This does not necessarily mean that Corbyn would have handled this situation 
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more effectively and successfully, but more and more citizens saw his leadership in this way. 
In a more abstract level: we cannot declare that one or the other type of democratic leadership 
would be better in a specific situation. May simply wanted to achieve more (like a charismatic 
leader) than what she could be expected to do, or for what she created need among citizens. She 
has lost her ability to form an effective and strong relationship with followers, which set the 
boundaries, or even the end, of her leadership. 
Table 7: Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership 
 Theresa May Jeremy Corbyn 
Good leadership 
Challenges making politics (delivering Brexit based on the 
will of electorate) 
 
- produce governmental program based on 
public interest („Brexit means Brexit”, 
„Global Britain”, „Great Meritocracy”) 
- ensuring political participation („Give me the 
mandate”, snap election) 
(transactional leadership) 
moral founding („kinder” democratic politics,) 
 
 
- moral guidance (mediating values) 
- empowering followers (constant mobilization 
and movement politics) 
- constructive and adaptive problem solving 
based on deliberation („human rights 
language”, encouraging open political 
discourse) 
(transforming leadership) 
Political 
knowledge 
techne (Brexit delivered as a political product 
based on hard power and selective incentives: 
„no deal is better than a bad deal”, „bloody 
difficult woman”) 
(transactional leadership) 
episteme (moral character) 
(transforming leadership) 
Right relationship 
Power relation exercising power over others  („Give me the 
mandate”, using hard power of her office) 
(transactional leadership) 
exercising power with others (grassroots 
mobilization to overcome the moral challenge of 
Brexit) 
(transforming leadership) 
Direction of 
interactions 
vertical (positional approach of leadership, 
interest-based relation) 
(transactional leadership) 
horizontal (relation based on participation and 
values) 
(transforming leadership) 
 
Role of leaders 
reactive (changing the position on Brexit, 
forming cabinet) 
proactive (hard understanding of Brexit to form 
preferences) 
coactive (lead the flow of politics but not dominate 
it) 
and followers proactive (preferences and interest of the 
ordinary working people expressed in the 
referendum) 
(transactional leadership > charismatic 
leadership) 
coactive (empowering ordinary working people 
and movement politics) 
(transforming leadership) 
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